David Cahn

U.S. law applicable to manufacturer’s application of retail pricing requirements has been in flux since the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). In that decision, the Court overruled the holding in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 31 S. Ct. 376 (1911), that any agreement not to sell a product at below a specific minimum price was per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the U.S.’s primary antitrust statute.

In Leegin, the Court ruled that, in determining whether Section 1 of the Sherman Act is violated by a series of express agreements in which dealers promise not to sell a manufacturer’s product at below a specific retail price, courts would apply the so-called “Rule of Reason” to determine whether such an agreement actually causes harm to competition. To boil this down, such an agreement will not violate U.S. antitrust law if (a) the manufacturer does not have more than 25% market share for the sale of that type of product, and (b) the minimum pricing program is not the result of the demands of a single dominant retailer or an agreement among retailers purchasing a substantial percentage of the goods to demand that the manufacturer adopt such policies (as opposed to individual retailers’ complaints).

An example of the “dealer cartel” scenario was a 2008 ruling in Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., in which Mack Trucks terminated a dealer who repeatedly sought sales of products in other dealer’s primary service areas by undercutting the local dealers on price. After numerous dealers complained about that specific discounter, and after Mack demanded that the discounter comply with pricing guidelines, Mack Trucks finally ceases supplying the discounter. Because Mack Trucks does have appreciable market power nationally in heavy construction equipment, the U.S. District Court refused to grant Mack summary judgment and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision.

A fact pattern in which a dominant retailer allegedly coercing several manufacturers into minimum pricing requirements is a 2008 ruling in Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., which a court refused to dismiss a claim by an Internet retailer involving alleged actions by “Babies ‘R’ Us“ with regard to the sale of strollers and other baby products. Specifically, Babies ‘R’ Us allegedly threatened to cease buying the manufacturers’ items or to give them extremely unfavorable shelf space and promotion unless the manufacturer enforced a minimum RPM program with regard to Internet retailers. Because Babies ‘R’ Us has sufficient market power to coerce the manufacturers with such threats, its actions may have harmed competition at the consumer level and therefore violated the Sherman Act.

If a manufacturer has appreciable market power in a product market, then the risk of a series of minimum RPM agreements increases, particularly if manufacturers that also have substantial market share implement similar minimum RPM agreements and this “parallel conduct” causes an overall increase in pricing for “high-quality” apparel of this type. Such contracts may still be permissible under U.S. antitrust law if the manufacturer can demonstrate that it is driven by the desire to maintain the brand’s profile in high end (and high volume) traditional retail outlets, which would not be possible without such a program. If it can make the business case that such a move actually will result in higher total volume sales on a wholesale basis, then such contract clauses may be “pro-competitive” as envisioned by the Supreme Court in Leegin.

Yes, but What About State Antitrust Laws?

As the Supreme Court emphasized in a 1989 opinion, “Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies”, and states are free to enact laws that further the purposes embodied by U.S. anti-trust law of “deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation of victims of that conduct.” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989). In somewhere between 11 and 14 different U.S. states, including California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York, New Jersey and Ohio, it is illegal to enter into any contract requiring another party to agree to not to sell a product or service below a specific price. The manufacturer cannot enforce an express minimum RPM agreement with any retailer that is headquartered in any of those states, and it is possible that such retailers could prevail in a state law civil antitrust claim if the manufacturer refuses to sell and the retailer can prove damages from not being able to obtain the manufacturer’s products.

Moreover, in eight states (including California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey and New York), consumers have standing as “indirect purchasers” to pursue claims for damages in the amount of inflated prices caused by resale price maintenance programs. The decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., Case No. 101,100 (decided May 4, 2012), Kansas’ highest court reversed summary judgment against the plaintiffs in a class action case brought under Kansas’ anti-trust statute against the same manufacturer of Brighton leather goods that had won the U.S. Supreme Court victory in 2007. Under the Kansas law, the practice of implementing and enforcing a retail pricing policy to be a per se violation of Kansas anti-trust statute, which that court summarized as follows:

There are alternate theories under which a Kansas restraint of trade plaintiff may proceed [under the state’s statute]: A plaintiff may prove the existence of an arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination between persons designed to advance, reduce, or control price, or one that tends to advance, reduce, or control price. Mere arrangements between persons are within the scope of the statute; a plaintiff does not have to show a relationship rising to the level of an agreement. In addition, it is enough to show that the arrangement is designed to or tends to control prices; a plaintiff does not have to show that the arrangement actually succeeds in increasing prices.

It remains to be seen whether other states with statutes that more specifically address resale price maintenance follow this opinion and find that a practice intended to maintain a brand’s retail pricing is a violation, even if it is not embodied in a formal agreement between the manufacturer and its retailers.

Manufacturer’s Unilateral Use of a Pricing Policy

If a manufacturer sells at wholesale through purchase orders or other less formal means than written dealer agreements, there is little need for any reciprocal written agreement with retailers. Instead, in accepting purchase orders a manufacturer might unilaterally state, “Our products will be delivered to you with minimum suggested retail pricing (“MSRP”) for each item. If you sell any of our products at below the MSRP, we reserve the right to refuse to supply you with our products at wholesale in the future.” Such a policy is not a considered a “contract, combination or conspiracy” in restraint of trade, but rather the unilateral act of the seller. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See also, Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that similar “rights reserved” language in a standard written, bilateral distributor agreement constituted unilateral action permissible under Colgate).

California and New York courts have confirmed that proper implementation of a Colgate policy is not a violation of their state antitrust laws. State of New York v. Tempur-pedic International, Inc., 916 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 2011) and Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation 93 Cal. App. 4th 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). However, the New York Attorney General’s office appeal of the adverse trial court ruling in Temper-pedic is currently pending.

Another method of mitigating risks is to use a Minimum Advertised Price (“MAP”) policy, rather than MSRP. Such a policy would merely restrict the advertising of the product for sale below a specific price. It does not restrict retailers from discounting at checkout, whether at a physical location or the “shopping cart” of a website, if the discounting is evenly applied to all goods sold by the retailer and is not specific to the manufacturer’s products.

There are disadvantages to using a Colgate policy. First, the manufacturer cannot offer more favorable pricing or terms for retailers who explicitly agree to adhere to the MSRP, since that would turn the policy into a bilateral agreement. Second, the manufacturer’s sole remedy is to cease selling to the retailer without issuing any additional warning. Confronting the retailer and demanding that it comply with policy risks waiving the Colgate defense to a claim of unlawful conspiracy, particularly if (as is usually the case) the confrontation is prompted by complaining dealers. Under Colgate, the manufacturer is free to “cut off” the discounter after receiving complaints from other retailers (subject to the “dealer cartel” issue explained above), but it cannot try to coerce the “violator” into complying.

Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. demonstrates the difficulty of proving that a pricing program’s implementation was truly “unilateral” by the manufacturer. While acknowledging that truly unilateral conduct by “Brighton” by issuing a pricing policy and then cutting off violating retailers would not prove a “combination” that is necessary to violate Kansas’ antitrust law. However, the Court found that two emails from Brighton’s chief operating officer to retailers, one denying a retailer’s request to offer discounted pricing and another explaining why compliance with the policy was important for all retailers of Brighton products, was sufficient evidence to show a knowing “arrangement” between Brighton and independent retailers to maintain the prices paid by consumers to Brighton’s suggested retail price. That court was clearly influenced by the facts that Brighton has a substantial direct to consumer retail sales division, including its own retail stores in Kansas, and also that Brighton “cut off” at least one Kansas retailer after receiving complaints about its discount pricing from another independent Kansas retailer.

Promotional Allowances

The one “inducement” that a manufacturer may be able to provide and remain within the Colgate exemption is promotional assistance to retailers who comply with MSRP or the MAP policy. If the manufacturer catches one of the retailers violating the policy, it can inform that retailer that it is no longer eligible for the allowance. The manufacturer should not “bargain” with the retailer after sending such a notice, i.e., agreeing to resume the assistance if the retailer agrees to comply with the policy. It can continue to supply the retailer and monitor its retail pricing and sales practices, and if that retailer starts complying then the manufacturer can resume providing promotional assistance. However, this type of program may be risky to use in the states identified above in which RPM programs are or may be per se unlawful.

Implementation

Even if individual retailers’ complaints (or threats) have led the manufacturer to decide to implement an MSRP or MAP policy, when implementing the policy the manufacturer should make clear to all of its wholesale customers that they are not to discuss retail pricing among themselves and that the manufacturer has the exclusive right to determine what steps to take if a customer does not comply with the policy. The manufacturer should then put in place a program to monitor compliance with the policy, either through internal staff or through a third party monitor. These steps are important to avoid converting a vertical manufacturer to retailer restraint into a horizontal conspiracy with complaining retailers that could be a per se violation of U.S. antitrust law. This is especially true if the manufacturer also sells direct to consumers on a retail basis.

International Law

As an attorney licensed in Maryland and the District of Columbia, I am qualified to provide a summary on U.S. anti-trust law as it concerns this subject, whereas I do not provide legal advice on other countries’ competition laws. However, as a general matter most other countries have yet to follow Leegin and continue to treat any manufacturer practices designed to set minimum retail price levels as per se illegal, and given that disposition are unlikely to look favorably on Colgate-like arguments regarding unilateral conduct in “cutting off” a seller who sells below the desired minimum price. In addition, European courts have issued decisions indicating that restrictions on the re-sale of products through the Internet will generally be considered violations of European competition law. See Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS (European Court of Justice, March 3, 2011).

There is some basis for a position that the competition laws of other countries will not be applicable to vertical pricing restraints in which both the manufacturer and their wholesale customers are small enterprises that do not have substantial market share in the relevant product types. However, an analysis of the applicable law of the foreign jurisdictions must be made through qualified counsel before a manufacturer pursues any programs to restrict minimum retail price.

David Cahn

In Next Generation Group, LLC v. Sylvan Learning Centers, LLC, Case CCB-11-0986 (decided Jan. 5, 2012), the plaintiff franchisee alleged that he agreed to develop and operate a new Sylvan Learning Center in Irving, Texas, in reliance upon representations from Sylvan that it would sell the plaintiff two existing Centers in nearby Arlington and Allen, Texas. According to the Amended Complaint, those representations were made orally by Sylvan’s agent to plaintiff’s principal both before and after the plaintiff signed the franchise agreement for Irving, but several weeks before the Irving location opened, Sylvan’s agent advised plaintiff’s principal “in writing that Sylvan had approved his acquisition of the Arlington and Allen Learning centers, respectively.” The parties executed letters of intent for the sale of both sites about two weeks before the Irving Center opened. However, about three weeks after the Irving Center opened, Sylvan’s same agent “informed [plaintiff] that Sylvan would not sell him the license and assets for any more franchises.” According to the Amended Complaint, Sylvan provided no explanation of its reversal of course. The franchisee claimed that Sylvan fraudulently induced it to develop and open the Irving location.

Sylvan argued for dismissal of the claims on the basis that the Irving franchise agreement contained an “integration clause” that prevented the plaintiff from relying on promises made outside that written agreement. The court rejected this, by quoting a prior court decision stating, “[T]he law in Maryland … is that a plaintiff can successfully bring a tort action for fraud that is based on false pre-contract promises by the defendant even if (1) the written contract contains an integration clause and even if (2) the pre-contractual promises that constitute the fraud are not mentioned in the written contract. Most of our sister states apply a similar rule. Greenfield v. Heckenbach, 144 Md. App. 108, 130, 797 A.2d 63, 76 (2002).” Sylvan’s problem is that the contractual “integration clause” did not disclaim any specific oral representations, and certainly not any concerning Sylvan’s willingness to sell the plaintiff additional existing franchised businesses. Without specific disclaimers as to representations made on that specific topic, the integration clause did not prevent pursuit of the claim.

While Sylvan could use the presence of the integration clause at trial to challenge whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on promises made outside of the Irving franchise agreement, based on the facts alleged the court stated, “there is reason to believe [plaintiff] could reasonably have relied on Sylvan’s representations” concerning the sale of the existing locations. Therefore, the court held that permitting the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint would not be “futile” and granted the plaintiff’s motion to do so.

After the plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint, Sylvan immediately moved to dismiss it on essentially the same grounds as asserted previously, and the court once again refused to dismiss the claims for fraud and violation of the Maryland Franchise Registration & Disclosure Law. Accordingly, the parties are now conducting discovery that may take most of 2012 to complete.

It is important to recognize that the proceedings in this case to date solely concern the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s factual allegations as a matter of law, and in later proceedings Sylvan’s representatives will provide information on what occurred with regard to this franchise sale. Nevertheless, the decision reiterates an important point for all Maryland business people – even if promises and statements are excluded from a particular written agreement, they may have legal consequences if the subsequent business relationship fails to meet the other party’s expectations.

David Cahn

An appeals court has held that Doctor’s Associates, Inc., the franchisor of Subway® sandwich shops, could be liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits for the injured employee of a franchisee under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act because the franchisee could fit the Act’s definition of a “subcontractor” and Doctors Associates could be considered a “prime contractor”.  Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Brown, et al., Case No. 2010-CA-000283-WC (Ct. App. Ky., Sept. 3, 2010).

David Cahn

Under the Wisconsin law, a “dealer” is one who is granted the right by contract to “use [the grantor's] trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising or other commercial symbol” and has “a community of interest” with the other party to the contract “in the business of offering, selling or distributing goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or otherwise.” The Girl Scouts of the United States argued that its contract with the affiliate was not “commercial” and that the affiliate was not “in business.” To that, the Court said:

. . . one doesn’t usually think of nonprofit enterprises as being “commercial” and engaged in “business.” Or didn’t use to–for outweighing these hints is the fact that nonprofit enterprises frequently do engage in “commercial” or “business” activities, and certainly the Girl Scouts do. Proceeds of the sale of Girl Scout cookies are the major source of Manitou’s income. The local councils sell other merchandise as well. Sales of merchandise account for almost a fifth of the national organization’s income, and most of the rest comes from membership fees and thus depends on the success of the local councils in recruiting members; that in turn depends on the councils’ revenues and thus gives the national organization an indirect stake in the cookie sales.

646 F.3d at 987. The Court went on to emphasize that, when competing with for-profit entities in commercial enterprises and endeavors, nonprofits may be held to the same legal standards of conduct.

Laws that prohibit termination or cancellation of a dealer or franchisee, except for “good cause,” are called “franchise relationship” laws. Wisconsin’s definition of a “dealer” is similar to the definition of a “franchise” under the franchise relationship laws of Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey. Another 11 states have franchise relationship laws, but require the “franchisee” to prove that it was required to pay some sort of “fee” as a condition of selling goods or services under the “grantor’s” trademark. Such “fees” have been deemed charged if the “franchisee” was required to pay the “franchisor” for a policies and procedures manual, for its director to attend a training conference, or even for marketing materials to distribute to prospective customers of the good or service.

The 15 states that have laws regulating the granting of a franchise, typically known as “franchise sales laws,” mandate certain disclosures be provided to prospective franchisees and that the franchisor refrain from certain actions in recruiting franchisees. All of those laws also contain a requirement that the “grantee” directly or indirectly pay some sort of “fee” to the grantor as a condition of operating under the grantor’s trademark. Most of those laws do not require that the fee be paid up front, and thus the fee could be a percentage of the grantee’s cash received in operating the business. However, payments from the grantee to the grantor for products at their “bona fide wholesale price” cannot be franchise fees, and the payment of commissions to the grantee when it has acted as a bona fide sales agent of the grantor are excluded. However, if the fee element is satisfied and there is substantial association with a common name, then Judge Posner’s reasoning on what is a “commercial endeavor” and operation of a “business” could be meaningful in proving the existence of a franchise.

The Federal Trade Commission also has a trade regulation rule that contains disclosure requirements and recruitment prohibitions that are similar to the state franchise sales laws. Fortunately for nonprofit organizations, the FTC has issued several advisory opinions finding that a nonprofit engaging in transactions that would otherwise be considered franchising were exempt from the Franchise Rule provided that (a) the licensor is not engaged in the relationship “for its own profit or the profit of its members,” and (b) the licensees are also bona fide non-profits. The first requirement is driven by the limit of the FTC’s jurisdiction, since it may only regulate a company “which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members.” 15 U.S.C. § 44. However, when the nonprofit associations of glass makers and insurance agents collaborated to form “The Glass Network” to enable the insurers to obtain lower cost auto glass replacement services and the glass makers access to that market, the FTC staff found that “network” to be covered by the Franchise Rule, notwithstanding its ownership by nonprofits. The Glass Network, LLC, FTC Informal Staff Advisory Opinion 04-4 (2004).

What follows are some key questions to ask in determining whether your chapter or affiliate program could be deemed a franchise system, or should otherwise focus on franchise law matters:

1. Are your members for-profit companies or professionals?

2. Is there an upfront affiliation fee or annual dues to maintain affiliate status, or a requirement that the affiliate purchase certain quantities of goods or services, regardless of customer demand?

3. Do your affiliates pay you a share of membership dues they receive, or does the affiliate receive membership commissions from you?

4. Is your association’s name or logo a prominent or significant part of the affiliate’s name or identity, from the perspective of its members?

5. Do your affiliates provide direct business development opportunities for their members (as opposed to general promotional benefit)?

6. Does a substantial portion of each of your affiliates’ revenues come from the sale of the same type of products or services, and are those products or services also sold by for-profit companies? Examples besides cookies are travel tours, function facility space, summer camps, or sports leagues.

7. Do your affiliates have exclusive territorial rights?

8. Is there a minimum quota of memberships that the affiliate must maintain?

9. Is good cause required to terminate the affiliate’s charter?

10. Is there a covenant not to compete after revocation of the charter, and if so who does it bind (i.e., just the affiliate as a nonprofit entity, or also its officers and directors)?

If a nonprofit organization or association answers “yes” to many of these questions, it may be advisable to review the chapter or affiliate structure – and applicable affiliation agreement – to mitigate the risk of inadvertently being considered to fall within the franchise laws.

David Cahn

Compliance costs and ongoing challenges of obtaining financing for new businesses have led many companies seeking growth to search for alternatives to franchising. These efforts, while quite understandable, have legal and practical implications. To understand whether they are worth the effort involved, it is important to analyze the nature of your business and its growth objectives by attempting to answer these types of questions:

1. Does your business primarily involve the sales of products you supply, the sale of products to be created by others using your methods, or the provision of services?

2. Does your business benefit from close association with a related enterprise? Examples are energy auditing, which is complementary to mechanical and renovation contractors, and the selling of fractional interests in real estate as part of a real estate brokerage business.

3. Will your business incur substantial upfront costs in the opening of new locations, either directly in the purchase of materials and inventory or indirectly in the time spent by staff in supporting the new operator?

4. Are your business methods a more compelling business asset than your brand name?

5. To what degree is poor service quality in one location likely to jeopardize the ongoing fortunes in other locations?

6. What is your ability to finance growth through profits from existing operations?

7. What is your appetite for risk in growth? Company-owned locations can be more profitable than franchises, but also substantially riskier for many reasons, including employment risk (for a recent example, see this National Labor Relations Board decision).

Your answers to these questions and others will help lead to the desired method of growth and, in turn, the steps required to comply with applicable laws and that safeguard your company’s interests. The answer could be granting a franchise for someone else to develop and own a truly new, independent business, i.e., licensing someone else to operate using your brand, under methods you prescribe and in exchange for fees paid to you. Alternatively, you might recruit local representatives who have successful related businesses to sell your product or service as a relatively small part of their ongoing operations. You might use profits from existing operations to finance part of the costs of opening new locations, while recruiting “local talent” who will finance the other part of the cost and operate those locations (as “partners”). Or perhaps you will offer stock in your company and recruit talented salespeople or managers who will make no cash investment, but who also will have more limited ability to control and profit from local operations over time.

Each such solution (and there may be more than one) requires different legal services and provide different challenges. As growth counselors, the attorneys of Whiteford Taylor & Preston L.L.P. have the skills to assist with any of these endeavors. Contact David L. Cahn to discuss your growth strategy.

Misrepresentations in Franchise Disclosures

The franchise agreement at issue in the case was for a Maoz Vegetarian® quick-serve restaurant that the plaintiff opened and operated in the Dupont Circle neighborhood in Washington, D.C. The franchisee alleged that the startup cost estimates in the franchisor’s government-mandated disclosure document (then known as the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular, or “UFOC”) dramatically underestimated the actual startup costs for its franchise, and that the franchisor knew that the representations were inaccurate at the time it made them. They alleged that the franchisor’s actions constituted violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Maryland Franchise Registration and Disclosure Law, as well as fraud as a matter of the general common law of Maryland.

In a decision during 1999 in the case of Motor City Bagels, LLC v. American Bagel Co., Civ. No. S-97-3474, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 11,654, another judge in the U.S. District Court for Maryland had held that a franchisor could have committed fraud by misrepresenting the initial investment costs in its UFOC by approximately 20 – 25%. By contrast, in this case the franchisee alleged that it had to spend more than twice the franchisor’s “maximum” estimate of $269,000 to open their restaurant, and that during 2008 the franchisor increased the “maximum” initial investment cost estimate in its UFOC by $225,000.

The UFOC specifically encouraged the franchisee to rely on the startup cost estimates in two ways. First, the UFOC specifically itemized various cost categories and provided sub-estimates for each category. Second, the UFOC pointed out that the estimates were based on the franchisor’s “15 years of combined industry experience and experience in establishing and assisting our franchisees in establishing and operating 23 [vegetarian restaurants] which are similar in nature to the Franchised Unit you will operate.”

The franchisor argued that cost projections were statements of opinion and could not constitute fraud because they were not susceptible to exact knowledge at the time they are made. However, the court held that erroneous projections could supply a basis for fraud under Maryland law in some cases. Whether projections were sufficiently concrete and material to qualify as statements of fact required a context-sensitive inquiry that could not be reduced to a single formula. An assessment of relevant factors—including the extent of the alleged discrepancy, whether the projection was based on mere speculation or on facts, and whether the projection was contrary to any facts in the franchisor’s possession—supported the conclusion that the franchisee had sufficiently stated a claim for fraud to proceed with factual discovery for its common law fraud and Maryland Franchise Law claims.

Jurisdiction in Maryland and Application of New York Franchise Sales Law

The franchise agreement in this case only permitted the franchisee to open a restaurant in the District of Columbia, and in fact that is where the restaurant has been operated. The defendant franchisor maintains its principal place of business in New York, and the parties’ first meeting concerning a potential franchise sale took place at the franchisor’s New York office. The plaintiff franchisee was formed by Maryland residents and, at the time of the franchise purchase, “maintained its principal place of business” in Chevy Chase, Maryland. The parties had numerous telephone conversations during which the franchisor’s representatives were located in New York and the franchisee’s representatives were in Maryland. The franchisor sent its UFOC and the proposed franchise agreement contract to the franchisee’s address in Maryland.

Based on those facts, the court found that those activities were sufficient to allow it to exercise jurisdiction, meaning that it could require the franchisor to defend itself in Maryland.

The franchisee filed a claim for violation of the New York Franchise Sales Act on that basis that the law applied because the franchise sale was made from New York. The court, following the express terms of that law and a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, found that the New York Franchise Sales Act protects franchisees in other states where offer and/or acceptance took place in New York. The rationale for extending the statute to situations such as this was to protect and enhance the commercial reputation of New York by regulating not only franchise offers originating in New York by New York-based franchisors.

The anti-fraud provisions of the Maryland Franchise Registration and Disclosure Law, as well as those of other states such as California, also apply to franchise sales made from the state. However, to the author’s knowledge, New York is the only state that requires franchisors based within its borders to obtain state registration approval before selling franchises to out of state residents.

The takeaways:

(1) Franchisors need to be vigilant to monitor the actual initial investment costs being incurred to open new locations (whether company-owned or franchised) and promptly update initial cost estimates. Prospective franchisees should not assume that the franchisor is doing this, and should ask existing franchisees about their initial investments before buying franchise rights.

(2) If a franchise seller is discussing a franchise sale with a person located in state with a franchise sales law, then the franchisor needs to determine if it needs to obtain pre-sale registration approval from that state before selling the franchise.

(3) New York needs to amend its law to exempt out of state franchise sales from its registration requirements.

In this Meineke case, the trial court had granted summary judgment dismissing the franchisor’s claim, on the bases that: (1) the franchise agreement did not state that the franchisee would be liable for royalties even if the business closed, and (2) even if Meineke had the right to seek lost future profits due to the franchisee’s closure of the stores, the claim failed because Meineke could not prove that it was “reasonably certain” that such profits would have been realized if the stores had not been closed. The U.S. Court of Appeals disagreed on both points and remanded the case for trial on Meineke’s claim.

On the first point, the court held that the parties are not required to specify in the Franchise Agreement all categories of potential damages each could seek as a result of the other’s breach. Rather, the standard is whether, at the time of entering into the agreement, “lost profits may reasonably be supposed to have been within [the parties’] contemplation as a probable result of [the franchisee’s] premature closure of the Shops.” A specific statement in the Franchise Agreement that the franchisee would be liable for all royalties throughout the term of the agreement would have been powerful evidence of the parties’ understanding when they signed the contracts. However, it was not the only admissible evidence of the parties’ “contemplation” on that issue, and therefore a factual dispute on that point existed – making it an issue for the jury to decide.

On the second point, the court emphasized that the royalties payable to Meineke were calculated from a percentage of the Stores’ gross revenue, not net profits. The court found that Meineke had demonstrated “with reasonable certainty” that, except for the franchisee’s breach of the agreements by closing the Shops, some revenue and therefore some lost royalties would have been realized. Thus, a trial was necessary to determine the amount of those lost “profits” with reasonable certainty.

However, at the trial, it would be relevant in making that determination how long it would have been “commercially feasible” to continue to operate each of the Shops, based on its historical net profits to the owner. In other words, the fact finder’s decision of how long it was “commercially feasible” to expect the franchisee to keep the doors open would determine the amount of the lost future royalties damages.

The takeaways:
(1) the only way that a franchisee and its personal guarantors can be sure that they will not be liable for lost future royalties if the franchise fails is to insist upon language in the franchise agreement eliminating (or limiting) the franchisor’s right to those damages.

(2) if a franchised store ceases operations and truly “goes dark” due to ongoing net operating losses, at trial on a claim for lost future royalties the franchisor will need to be able to demonstrate that it was “commercially feasible” for the franchisee to remain open and, if so, provide some reasonable basis for the fact finder to determine how long the store should have remained open.

Given the uncertainty and fact intensive nature of such a case, it is probably in the best interests of both the franchisor and the franchisee to directly address the issue in the written agreement the franchisor’s right to “lost future royalties” and an agreed upon method to calculate those “damages.”

The full opinion can be viewed at http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/092030.U.pdf

Criminal Price-Fixing Conspiracy Convictions Highlight Dangers

Two recent guilty pleas announced by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division highlight an underappreciated area of serious legal liability – price coordination in violation of the Sherman Act.

On August 24, 2011,the Justice Department announcedthe guilty plea of Great Lakes Concrete, one of four Iowa companies that sell “ready-mix concrete” for construction projects and have plead guilty to reaching agreements regarding their respective price lists and project bids and then accepting payment for those sales at prices artificially increased due to collusion. The press releaseemphasizes the maximum fine that may be imposed for the conviction, which is the greater of $100 million, twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime. In addition, the president of Great Lakes Concrete was sentenced to serve a year and a day in prison.

On August 31, 2011, the Justice Department announced a guilty plea by a California company, Sabry Lee (U.S.A.) Inc., in “a global conspiracy to fix the prices of aftermarket auto lights.”The company is the U.S. distributor for a Taiwan producer of the auto lights, which are most commonly installed in vehicles after collisions. The alleged conspiracy was apparently between several Taiwan based manufacturers of auto lights and their U.S. distributors, who “met and agreed to charge prices of aftermarket auto lights at certain predetermined levels” and “issued price announcements and price lists in accordance with the agreements reached, and collected and exchanged information on prices and sales of aftermarket auto lights for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing adherence to the agreed-upon prices.” Executives of two of the U.S. distributor companies have pled guilty to price-fixing charges, and the second ranking officer of one of the Taiwan manufacturers was arrested in the U.S. and has been indicted.

While the press release leads one to believe that the executives in these cases knowingly intended to fix prices at artificially high levels, it is quite possible that at least some of them were not completely aware of the legal implications of their conversations. However, any communications between competing companies concerning prices are legally risky.

The Takeaway: Business people should seek pricing intelligence from customers, service providers, or independent websites — but not from direct communications with their competitors. This is particularly true for industries in which formal competitive bidding is common or in which a relatively small number of companies make a large percentage of the total sales.

Beyond that basic rule, certain types of communications and collaborationsbetween competitors are permitted and even encouraged by U.S. antitrust law. Each situation needs to be analyzed based on the particular facts and reasons for your collaborative effort.